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FOREWORD
On April 21, 2019, three churches were attacked in Sri Lanka in a series of coordinated
terrorist suicide bombings. ISIS, which was said to have been “totally defeated” just two
months earlier, claimed credit for the bombings and released a video of its leader, Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi, calling on his jihadist followers to rally around his vision for ISIS. “Our
battle today,” he said, “is a battle of attrition, and we will prolong it for the enemy, and
they must know that the jihad will continue until Judgment Day.”
The Sri Lankan Islamist group, Jammiyathul Millathu Ibrahim, recruited for ISIS and
joined forces with the Islamist preacher Zahran Hashim, the alleged organizer of the
Easter Sunday attacks. Days before, he is said to have organized attacks on Buddhist
sculptures. As a result of those earlier attacks, police in Mawanella arrested thirteen
people.
The question many journalists have asked is what relationship there might be between
attacks on cultural heritage and attacks on the lives of those who profess a cultural
identity with these sites and objects and what they represent. The prime minister of Sri
Lanka, Ranil Wickremesinghe, noted a few days after the suicide bombings, “We know
that before the Buddhist images there were attacks on Sufi mosques. So they seem to be
going step by step. First their own Muslims [Sufis], then the Buddhists, and there was
something in a small church near Kandy [Kandekurry], information that they wanted to
damage the church.”
It is a thesis of the previous two J. Paul Getty Trust Occasional Papers in Cultural
Heritage Policy that there is a direct connection between brutal attacks on cultural
heritage and human lives. Not everyone agrees, of course. Helen Frowe and Derek
Matravers, authors of this Occasional Paper, argue, “At the time our newspapers were
filled with the destruction of Palmyra, there were also thousands of refugees fleeing the
war in Syria. There is, undeniably, something morally uncomfortable about stressing the
need to protect heritage in the face of such widespread human suffering.” Do they mean to
argue that it is never moral to protect heritage in the face of widespread human suffering?
Of course not. Their thesis, instead, is that attacks on cultural heritage do not necessarily
precede attacks on human beings, and that protecting cultural heritage can sometimes
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conflict with protecting people. Frowe and Matravers force us to clarify our arguments. It
is in this spirit that we publish this issue of our Occasional Papers.
This publication has been funded by the President’s Internal Council, J. Paul Getty
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INTRODUCTION
The destruction of cultural heritage is nothing new. But our connected world means that
today scenes of the destruction of heritage sites fill our newspapers and television screens
like never before. These scenes are met with widespread public outcry, with many
prominent figures insisting that something must be done to prevent, for example, the
destruction of ancient monuments by ISIS in the Middle East. But what, precisely, is the
appropriate response to the intentional destruction of tangible heritage, that is, attacks on
buildings, tombs, and other physical sites and objects?
One recent suggestion is that the protection of tangible cultural heritage is a just cause
for military intervention. Writing in this Occasional Papers series, Thomas G. Weiss and
Nina Connelly offer the most developed and explicit work on this topic to date.1 They
argue that the combination of the generally objectionable nature of a group like ISIS and
the wide publicity generated by their attacks on heritage has created an opportunity for
action.2 Saving cultural heritage has come to be regarded as part of the fight against
terrorism; the question now, they suggest, “is how best to take advantage of what appears
a propitious moment.”3 Drawing heavily on the doctrine of responsibility to protect
(R2P)—the political framework intended to protect against genocide, ethnic cleansing, and
crimes against humanity—they propose a parallel framework for understanding the
international community’s obligations to heritage. They argue that the three “pillars” of
the R2P framework can be modified for or extended to cultural heritage protection. These
modified pillars would stipulate (i) that it is the primary responsibility of states to protect
heritage in their territory, (ii) that others ought to assist in building this protective
capacity, and (iii) that there is an international responsibility to respond to protect
heritage should the first two pillars fail. This third pillar, they argue, includes military
intervention.
Weiss and Connelly’s proposal is distinctive in that it clearly argues for the use of
military force to defend tangible heritage. While military force can, of course, be used to
deter and detain, it also typically involves inflicting serious physical harms, including
death, on both putative wrongdoers and innocent bystanders. Despite the calls that
something must be done to prevent the destruction of heritage, few prominent figures
have explicitly called for those who are destroying cultural heritage to be killed, even
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though it is clear that in many cases heritage could not be protected without the use of
lethal force.4 Indeed, that such force is warranted seems to be the natural upshot of some
of the arguments put forward by prominent figures in the heritage sector, even though
they do not articulate it.
Although Weiss and Connelly call for the forceful defense of heritage for its own
sake—that is, the use of force when heritage alone is threatened—their discussion draws
on various other justifications for the use of force, such as the role of heritage protection
in preempting genocide. As we shall argue, this conflation of multiple justifications makes
their proposal—that we simply adopt parallel R2P doctrines for people and heritage—look
more plausible than it is. Disentangled from these other justifications, it is hard to make a
plausible case for the forceful defense of heritage in its own right.
We distinguish between what we call extrinsic and intrinsic justifications for the use of
force to defend cultural heritage. Extrinsic justifications hold that protecting heritage is a
means to achieve some other valuable goal, where it is achieving that goal that provides
the justification for force. For example, it is widely argued that preventing the destruction
of heritage is a means to prevent genocide. If preventing genocide warrants the use of
force and if preventing the destruction of heritage achieves this goal, we have an extrinsic
justification for forcefully protecting heritage.
Extrinsic justifications do not attribute to heritage any particular value in its own right.
Of course, proponents may believe that heritage is also intrinsically valuable. But they do
not invoke this value as a justification for the use of force. Rather, the justification for
force is grounded in the capacity of heritage protection to prevent the physical harms to
humans that occur in genocide. Weiss and Connelly draw on this connection between
heritage protection and genocide prevention to support their call for military action.
In contrast to extrinsic justifications for heritage protection, intrinsic justifications cite
the value of heritage as the basis for using force. Such justifications might invoke the role
of heritage in creating and preserving people’s communities, providing connections to the
past, and so on. These justifications are thus importantly different in character from the
extrinsic justifications described above. Intrinsic justifications focus specifically on the
value of heritage in people’s lives (broadly construed) and present this as a reason to
forcefully defend heritage even if doing so is not a means of achieving other valuable
goals.
In addition to calling for military intervention on extrinsic grounds, Weiss and
Connelly argue for military intervention to defend heritage for its own sake, that is,
because of the intrinsic value of heritage in people’s lives rather than because protecting
heritage achieves other valuable ends. Intrinsic justifications for force, of the sort on
which Weiss and Connelly’s proposal partly relies, are much harder to defend than
extrinsic justifications. It is much less obvious that the goods that might be facilitated or
provided by heritage warrant lethal defense. As we explain, a call for military
intervention aimed at protecting heritage for its own sake must be underpinned by
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compelling arguments for the claims that we may (i) intentionally harm persons to
prevent them from damaging heritage and (ii) foreseeably harm persons as a side effect of
preventing damage to heritage. Supporting either of these claims requires (iii) an account
of how to compare harms to people to damage to heritage, which itself demands (iv) some
way of assessing the value of (particular examples of) heritage. None of these
requirements is acknowledged, let alone satisfied, by Weiss and Connelly.
In chapter 1, we explore some of the difficulties with supporting extrinsic justifications
for the forceful defense of heritage. In chapter 2, we discuss the idea that heritage might
provide an intrinsic justification for the use of force. In chapter 3, we show how Weiss and
Connelly conflate these two types of justifications in their paper. In chapter 4, we consider
the claim that it is permissible to intentionally harm persons to prevent them from
damaging heritage. In chapter 5, we argue that since military intervention inevitably
imposes a high risk of collaterally harming innocent people, it can be permissible only if
one may impose high risks of serious harm on innocent people for the sake of heritage.
Weiss and Connelly neither recognize the moral significance of collateral harms nor offer
an explanation of how such harms could be justified.
We should note that Weiss and Connelly present their paper as a starting point, not a
fully developed proposal. However, our core suggestion is that their starting point is
already too advanced, since it omits all the important moral features of a justification for
using force. Weiss and Connelly’s proposal—like much of the work in this field—thus
belies the genuine and complex moral challenges to the protection of cultural heritage that
must inform, and thus come prior to, discussion of policy.5 It is striking that Edward C.
Luck’s paper in this series considers six “lenses,” or frameworks, through which we might
approach the protection of cultural heritage—law, accountability, security,
counterterrorism, atrocity prevention, and cultural genocide—yet omits a distinctively
moral framework. We hope to show that any serious attempt to tackle the protection of
cultural heritage must first engage with the fundamental moral questions that we identify.
We are not claiming to offer a comprehensive account of permissible heritage protection.
But being clear about the issues one needs to address is an important first step in
developing such an account.




Examples of Extrinsic Justifications
Various extrinsic justifications have been put forward for the protection of heritage. Some
proponents of heritage protection argue that preventing the looting of heritage sites will
eliminate an important source of funding to terrorist organizations and thereby thwart
terrorist attacks and disrupt terrorist networks.6 Much of the work by the Committee of
the Blue Shield, perhaps the best known nongovernmental organization (NGO) in the field
of heritage protection, emphasizes the strategic and military value of respecting cultural
sites.7 With so many recent and ongoing conflicts taking place in urban environments, the
cooperation of local people—“winning hearts and minds”—can be a pivotal factor in the
success of a military operation. Destroying sites of cultural significance, whether through
ignorance or disregard, can seriously hamper the prospects of military success.
Proponents of heritage protection have thus channeled a fair amount of energy into
demonstrating the military advantages of heritage protection (of course, this is not to say
that they are themselves motivated by these advantages).8 Preventing the destruction of
cultural sites can also facilitate postconflict reconciliation and sustain important sources
of income for local people by protecting the tourism industry.9
Perhaps the most common, and important, extrinsic justification for heritage
protection is grounded in an alleged connection between threats to heritage and threats of
genocide. Many people argue that threats to cultural heritage are a precursor to violence
against people and that if one reacts to or preempts attacks on cultural heritage one can
thereby preempt that violence. This claim is most famously articulated by Raphael
Lemkin, who, echoing Heinrich Heine, argued that “burning books is not the same as
burning bodies, but when one intervenes in time against mass destruction of churches
and books one arrives just in time to prevent the burning of bodies.”10 Weiss and Connelly
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describe the destruction of heritage as an “alarm bell” for harms to people, citing the
infamous Kristallnacht attacks in Nazi Germany.11
These reasons for protecting heritage do not attribute to heritage any particular
intrinsic value. Of course, their proponents may also believe that heritage is intrinsically
valuable. But they do not invoke this value as a justification for protecting heritage.
Rather, it is the capacity of heritage protection to prevent, for example, physical harms to
humans of the sort involved in genocide and terrorism, or the harms of poverty, that
explains why heritage ought to be protected.
Heritage and Genocide
It seems plausible that at least some of the ends specified by extrinsic justifications for
protecting heritage—such as curtailing terrorist attacks and halting or preventing
genocide—warrant the use of lethal force. Lethal defense is a proportionate response to
the threat of death and other serious physical harms.
That there exists such a connection between, say, attacks on heritage and genocide is of
course an empirical claim. If true, it would help justify the use of force in cases in which
heritage is threatened. But if our concern is the protection of heritage for the purpose of
preventing atrocities, it is not clear why the current R2P doctrine does not adequately
enshrine such protection in law. The current R2P doctrine stipulates that “actual or
apprehended” large-scale loss of life is a cause for intervention.12 If there is indeed a
robust predictive connection between the widespread destruction of heritage and
genocide, then international law seems to already sanction the use of force to protect
against the destruction of heritage. Insofar as Weiss and Connelly’s proposal relies on the
role of protecting heritage in preventing genocide, then, it looks redundant. The efforts of
those who are concerned to save heritage would be best directed toward producing solid
empirical evidence of this connection rather than drafting new norms or legislation. As
Luck points out, “It would make little sense for practitioners to downgrade the status of
cultural genocide if it is, in fact, the most reliable sign of coming physical and biological
genocide.”13
An important part of this empirical work would be to establish the precise relationship
between the destruction of heritage and harms to people. To do the necessary justificatory
work, this relationship must have two features. First, the destruction of heritage must
reliably indicate the threat of genocide. Second, preventing the destruction of heritage
must reliably avert the threatened genocide. Of course, “reliably” is a somewhat vague
term: given the grave harm at stake in genocide, one might think that a fairly low
probability that attacks on heritage will be followed by genocide suffices to make lethal
force permissible. But, as with any military intervention, one must remember that grave
harms are also at stake when one uses military force. Any intervention aimed at
protecting heritage faces the same concerns regarding escalation and collateral harm as
besets other types of intervention. Given this, one cannot set the bar too low.
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Heritage Destruction as Indicative of Genocide
Note that the first feature of the relationship between attacks on heritage and genocide
would not be established by showing that attacks on people are always preceded by
attacks on heritage. Luck, in his discussion of Lemkin, makes this faulty inference. Even if
it is true that genocide is always preceded by attacks on heritage, it does not follow that
attacks on heritage are “the most reliable sign of coming physical and biological genocide.”
By way of comparison: it may be true that Amy’s eating at her favorite out-of-town
restaurant is always preceded by Amy’s driving her car, but Amy’s driving her car is not a
reliable sign that she is going to her favorite restaurant. To justify harmfully protecting
heritage on these grounds, one must show not that genocide is always or usually preceded
by attacks on heritage but rather that attacks on heritage always or usually precede at
least an attempt at genocide. And yet this latter claim seems implausible given the many
examples of damage to heritage that are not part of or precursors to genocidal campaigns.
Protesters have recently defaced many statues of Cecil Rhodes in South Africa, for
example, but there has been no attempted genocide of or widespread violence against
white South Africans, nor does any such violence seem likely. Heritage might also be
destroyed as a means of coercion but without genocidal intent (the bombing of Dresden by
British forces in World War II is an example of this). And, of course, a great deal of
heritage is damaged or removed in the course of looting, but it seems unlikely that, in
general, the looters also have genocidal intent.
An analysis of whether the destruction of heritage is a reliable predictor of genocide
should also have a comparative dimension. One needs to know not only how reliably the
destruction of heritage precedes threats to persons but also whether it does so more
reliably than other factors. This will matter for whether one should treat attacks on
heritage as sufficient evidence of genocidal intent or merely as one (more or less reliable)
defeasible indicator of genocidal intent among others. For example, there is evidence that
the extent of a population’s access to mass media is the most important determinant of
whether unrest will turn into violence against persons.14 This evidence shows that wider
access to mass media decreases the chances of violence. In his analysis of this evidence, T.
Camber Warren recognizes that this result may seem surprising given the widely reported
role of social media in mobilizing resistance movements. But, in a similar vein to the
foregoing remarks, he notes that the reason mass media has seemed to lead to violence is
that
studies of the relationship between mass media and mass violence observe mass
communication behavior only in those countries that are experiencing the outbreak of
large-scale civil conflict. It should hardly be surprising that in the midst of brutal civil
wars the mass media have frequently been observed to transmit inflammatory
messages. However, this observation does not constitute evidence that mass media
systems are generally inclined to the promotion of collective violence, nor does it
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Likewise, even a very strong correlation between the destruction of heritage and genocide
in countries in which genocide has occurred cannot tell us how reliably destruction of
heritage leads to genocide. We also need to take into account the myriad cases in which
heritage is damaged and no genocide occurs or is credibly threatened.
Heritage Protection as Averting Genocide
The second part of the relationship—that preventing the destruction of heritage also
prevents genocide—is no less important if it is the connection to genocide that is to justify
the use of force. Weiss and Connelly tell us that “curators and archivists, recognizing the
warning signals [of genocide], have died while attempting to save heritage in the face of
early violent attacks.”16 This description (along with their wider proposal) implies that the
successful protection of heritage might somehow prevent a genocide that would otherwise
have taken place. But, given both its role in their proposal and its moral significance, we
need a much clearer explication of this claim than Weiss and Connelly offer.
One way to defend this claim is to draw on the role of dehumanization in creating the
conditions for genocide. The attitude that members of the target group are in some way
inferior or deserving of harm might, in some cases, first manifest as attacks on the group’s
heritage. But in such cases the belief in the target group’s inferiority or lack of desert must
be at least partly inculcated in the perpetrators prior to the attacks: they must already
believe that the target group’s monuments, manuscripts, and sacred sites are legitimate
targets. It is thus hard to see how in these cases merely defeating attacks of heritage could
be an effective means of ridding the perpetrators of those beliefs. One does not stop one’s
genocidal campaign because one failed to take the library.
Alternatively, leaders might order or encourage attacks on heritage as a first step
toward genocide, knowing that it is easier to persuade people to attack buildings than to
kill other people. In these cases, attacks on heritage will form part of the process of
dehumanizing the target group rather than the outcome of the attackers having already
inculcated those beliefs. But again, it is not clear that forcibly preventing these attacks
would prevent the perpetrators from going on to inculcate the belief that members of the
target group are legitimate targets. It seems equally likely that being met with forceful
resistance might engender further animosity and a desire for revenge. Here, too, the
causal relationship between preventing attacks on heritage and preventing genocide is
unclear.
Of course, if one kills (a sufficient number of) the people attacking the heritage and
those people would have gone on to commit genocide, then one will have prevented
genocide in the course of defending heritage.17 This relationship, at least, is clear.
Something similar is true in cases in which the attacks on heritage are intended to
demoralize and intimidate the target group in order to make them easier to defeat
provide any insight into the factors that allow some countries to avoid the outbreak of
such conflict in the first place.15
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militarily.18 When attacks on heritage are a straightforward means of trying to achieve the
goal of genocide, thwarting this means will at least decrease the probability of genocide.
Since preventing genocide (and comparable harms, such as mass enslavement, rape, or
forced displacement) warrants lethal force, lethal force could be a permissible response in
these cases. It is better to preempt genocide than to respond once it is under way. But this
simply reinforces the need to clearly establish the first part of the causal relationship, that
is, to show, to a high degree of certainty, that the particular people whom we will
intentionally kill while defending heritage are indeed bent on genocide. If our evidence
about the connection between attacks on heritage and genocide is more mixed—that is, if
there is a significant number of cases in which attacks on heritage are not followed by
genocide—then we are unlikely to meet the standard of proof required for killing.19
None of what we say here should be taken as skepticism that the destruction of
heritage is often connected to, and may be an indicator of, genocide. But if one relies on
this connection to justify killing people, the nature of the connection must be clearly
established, showing both that attacks on heritage are a reliable predictor of genocide and
that thwarting those attacks reliably prevents genocide. The importance of demonstrating
these claims is easily overlooked in the contexts of the recent conflicts in Iraq and Syria,
where members of ISIS were killing people and destroying heritage at the same time. We
can agree that members of ISIS were legitimate targets in virtue of the threat they posed to
people’s lives. But this does not establish a general causal connection between defending
heritage and preventing threats to people’s lives. And one cannot infer the permissibility
of lethally defending heritage from the permissibility of lethally preventing unjust killing.




Weiss and Connelly, in addition to endorsing various extrinsic justifications for the
forceful defense of heritage, propose a wider scope for the defense of heritage, which
includes the defense of heritage for its own sake. These intrinsic justifications for the use
of force focus on the value of heritage rather than the value of other goals that might be
achieved by protecting heritage.
There are two types of intrinsic justifications, underpinned by different conceptions of
the value of heritage. The stronger conception holds that heritage is valuable for its own
sake, independently of its importance to human beings. On this view, cultural sites and
artifacts would be valuable even if no human cared about them, or if humans ceased to
exist.
The more moderate, and most common, conception holds that heritage has derivative
value.20 Objects of derivative value derive their value from their contribution to
something with intrinsic value, in this case, the well-being of human beings. A great deal
of cultural heritage—perhaps all heritage that is not part of the natural environment—is
plausibly valuable only if and because it contributes to how well people’s lives go. One
way in which heritage contributes to well-being is by providing what Janna Thompson
calls “opportunities for enrichment.” Thompson argues that the constraints on the fighting
of a war are motivated “by the moral importance of limiting war, of making it possible for
important values to survive armed conflict. Above all, it should be possible for the
opportunities intrinsic to civilized life to survive and be enjoyed by future
generations—and this includes being able to appreciate its greatest products.”21 Such
views are widely echoed in the heritage sector, although they raise difficult questions
about the ownership and control of heritage sites. It is not only members of the group that
has produced an artifact who might be enriched by interaction with it: as Weiss and
Connelly put it, many people “view culture as a shared endeavor across peoples and time”
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and regard the destruction of heritage in general as a cost to “humanity as a whole” rather
than (merely) to the specific group that produced the heritage in question.22
Less controversially, heritage contributes to the well-being of those groups that
regularly interact with it or that identify with the original producers. Heritage can
facilitate the forming and sustaining of communities, allow those communities to express
certain values, and create intergenerational ties that bind the community together. This
contribution to well-being is the focus of many accounts of the value of heritage. As
Thompson argues, “A community is bound together through the places where people live
and work, and its public buildings provide the infrastructure for their social relationships.
Schools and places of worship or public assembly are the focus of the lives of many
individuals, and provide resources that help to make their lives worth living.”23 Weiss and
Connelly argue that “the destruction of cultural heritage is ruinous for cultural identity
and social cohesion. The buildings, museums, libraries, and infrastructure around which
societies organize themselves in part help define a people.”24
This entwining of people and heritage is one way in which proponents of protecting
heritage seek to defuse the objection that they are prioritizing stones over lives. This
objection holds that proponents of heritage protection demonstrate an inappropriate
degree of concern about old buildings and artifacts, compared to that which they evince
toward human beings. At the time our newspapers were filled with the destruction of
Palmyra, there were also thousands of refugees fleeing the war in Syria. There is,
undeniably, something morally uncomfortable about stressing the need to protect heritage
in the face of such widespread human suffering.
But according to one form of this type of intrinsic justification for defending heritage,
heritage and people are all of a piece. And by equating saving heritage with saving people,
we can deny that saving heritage can conflict with saving lives. For example, Weiss and
Connelly argue, “The protection of people and the protection of heritage are inseparable.…
There is no need for a hierarchy of protection because the choice between the two is false,
just as a choice between people and the natural environment is false. Air, water, and
culture are essential for life.”25 In a recent public debate on protecting cultural heritage,
the artist Issam Kourbaj suggested that “heritage without people means nothing; people
without heritage means nothing.”26 At the same event, Vernon Rapley, director of Cultural
Heritage Protection and Security at the Victoria & Albert Museum in London, claimed that
“people without culture is like a tree without roots. There’s no point [in the] military going
in to protect a country unless they protect the country, not just save the lives of people.
[Heritage] makes the difference between living and life.”27 The UK Committee of the Blue
Shield maintains that the Hague Convention on Cultural Property Protection does not
“place cultural property above people, as it exists within a wider framework of laws
designed to protect civilians and their property in a conflict situation.”28 The art historian
Nausikaä El-Mecky suggests that heritage and people are sometimes “one and the same
thing.”29 Irina Bokova, former director-general of UNESCO, claims that “there is no need to
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choose between saving lives and preserving cultural heritage: the two are inseparable.”30
She has also claimed that to destroy Syrian heritage is “to kill the Syrian people a second
time.”31
What the foregoing arguments have in common is a claim about the constitutive role of
heritage in people’s lives going well (or, indeed, their having lives at all). Rather than
suggesting that attacks on heritage are worrying primarily insofar as they are indicative of
worse harms to come, the claim here is that people and heritage are bound up in such a
way that one cannot distinguish between them and, by implication, one therefore need not
choose between them. On this view, attacks on heritage are attacks on people and,
perhaps, people’s lives are not worth living (or saving) in the absence of heritage.
It can be hard to pin down these arguments, since they often rely on unhelpful
metaphors and trade on ambiguity in the meaning of words such as life or people. It is
clearly not the case, for example, that air and culture are on a par in terms of what people
need to survive, and such claims do little to help us understand the moral status of
heritage. Rather, this claim equivocates between what people—that is, persons—need to
survive and what a people—that is, a cultural group of some sort—needs to survive. But
one cannot infer the moral importance of the survival of “peoples” from the moral
importance of the survival of persons. One certainly cannot infer the permissibility of
killing to defend peoples from the permissibility of killing to defend persons.
Similarly, the fact that the legal protection of heritage is packaged as part of a “wider
framework of laws” regarding civilians is no reason at all to think that saving heritage
cannot conflict with the interests of persons. Indeed, it seems inevitable that such conflicts
will arise, not least because civilians are not the only persons at risk of harm in war.
Conflicts between heritage and persons arise whenever, for example, a combatant is asked
to incur an increased risk of harm in order to avoid damaging a cultural site. With respect
to sites that have been granted enhanced protection by UNESCO, Article 12 of the Second
Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention requires combatants to refrain “from any use of
the property or its immediate surroundings in support of military action.”32 Insofar as
combatants might have otherwise used such a site, they presumably would have done so
because it was militarily advantageous: because the site provides the most protected
position, the best vantage point, and so on. Demanding that combatants refrain from using
the site—that they occupy a more exposed position or use a worse vantage point—is to
demand that they operate at increased risk for the sake of heritage.
Article 12 also implies that combatants can be required to impose greater risks on
civilians in order to avoid damaging heritage. If making use of, or endangering, a cultural
site would draw the battle away from civilians, prohibiting such use or endangering will
increase the risk to civilians. We can remain neutral on the permissibility of demanding
that combatants incur or impose these increased risks. The important point is that
incurring or imposing these risks does put heritage above people in a very concrete way.
The claim that heritage cannot conflict with lives is simply false. People may have an
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interest in their continued heritage, but they also have other interests, such as interests in
not being killed or maimed. Actions that promote their interests in their heritage may set
back their other interests. The failure or refusal to recognize this plurality of interests
undermines the credibility of these types of intrinsic justifications for heritage protection.




Again, none of this is to deny that heritage is valuable and contributes to human well-
being. But one must be cautious about the normative conclusions that one draws from the
role of heritage in people’s lives. In particular, one must avoid illicitly trading on the
connection between attacks on heritage and genocide, moving from the claim that
defending heritage sometimes preempts attacks on people to the claim that defense of
heritage is, in general, the defense of people, whether those people face genocide or not.
For example, Weiss and Connelly argue that, as with the original R2P doctrine, a
doctrine for protecting heritage should incorporate the possibility of military intervention.
The stipulated threshold for just cause for humanitarian intervention in the R2P doctrine
is the “large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is
the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed
state situation.”33 Weiss and Connelly suggest that this formulation “maps onto” the
protection of heritage: one should use military force to protect heritage when one faces
“large-scale loss of cultural heritage, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not,
which is the product of deliberate action by a state or a nonstate actor, or of neglect or
inability to act, or of a failed-state situation; or large-scale cultural cleansing, actual or
apprehended.”34 They also suggest that “military force should be deployed only in cases of
profound humanitarian distress and, by extension, serious attacks on cultural
heritage—for itself and as a precursor for the mass atrocities that almost certainly will
follow.”35
This way of reasoning about the permissibility of using force is mistaken, wrongly
implying that whatever is warranted for the protection of people must also be warranted
for the protection of heritage. It conflates extrinsic and intrinsic justifications for the use
of force, with its inclusion of attacks on heritage “with genocidal intent or not,”36 and
stipulation that heritage should be defended “for itself,” immediately followed by the
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claim that this will prevent “the mass atrocities that will almost certainly follow.”37 And
despite calling for defense of heritage even in the absence of any threat of wider atrocities,
they conclude their paper with the claim that “cultural cleansing and mass atrocities are
intertwined.”38 Weiss and Connelly first treat forcefully defending heritage as a natural
extension of forcefully defending people and then implicitly draw on the moral force of
the reasons we have to prevent genocide to support forcefully defending heritage. They
offer no independent justification for forcefully defending heritage, even though this is a
central, distinctive aspect of their proposal. To be clear, and as we discuss below, our claim
is not that only physical threats to persons can warrant forceful defense. Other goods,
such as the right to self-determination, also plausibly warrant forceful defense.39 It is
possible that the goods that are threatened by attacks on tangible heritage also warrant
forceful defense. Our claim is that one cannot infer this permissibility from the
permissibility of killing to save lives.
Weiss and Connelly do in fact note that waging a justified war requires us to weigh the
expected harms and benefits of that war. In the case of wars for heritage, this must mean
weighing the harms of war against the protection of heritage. But they misinterpret
familiar just war constraints, claiming that “proportional means [call] for the minimal
scale, duration, and intensity of military force required to accomplish the goal” and that
“reasonable prospects … [require] that the negative consequences do not outweigh the
benefits.”40 The requirement that force be of the minimum scale, duration, and
intensity—in other words, the least harmful means of achieving the goal—is not the
proportionality constraint but rather the necessity constraint.41 We can see this by noting
that one might employ the minimum amount of force required to accomplish one’s goal
without thereby acting proportionally. For example, killing Zara might be the only—and
thus the least harmful—way of stopping her from breaking Amir’s finger. But killing Zara
is not proportionate to saving Amir’s finger. What Weiss and Connelly call the
requirement of “reasonable prospects” is what just war theorists call the proportionality
constraint. Proportionality weighs the expected harms and benefits of force. Killing Zara is
disproportionate because the benefit of saving Amir’s finger does not outweigh the harm
of Zara’s death. The requirement of reasonable prospects is, to give it its full title, the
requirement of a reasonable prospect of success. This is usually taken to be distinct from
proportionality: killing Zara is disproportionate no matter how likely it is to save Amir’s
finger.42
Despite noting the importance of weighing benefits and harms for judging the justness
of war, Weiss and Connelly do not offer any explanation of how one might go about
comparing damage to cultural heritage to harms to people.43 Instead, they make two
contradictory moves. First, they assume that we can simply extend whatever account of
proportionality we use to judge forcefully preventing harms to human beings to judge
forcefully preventing harm to heritage. This is the basic structure of their proposal, which
simply adopts the language of R2P for the defense of heritage. Second, they assert that
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establishing “a hierarchy for protecting people and property is counterproductive.”44 At
the very least, these claims cannot both be true. One cannot do proportionality
calculations without some way of ranking the relevant goods. And both are plausibly false.
The first claim is clearly mistaken: human beings and heritage are very different types
of goods, and the moral significance of harming humans does not typically attach to
damaging objects. Thus the permissibility of killing a person who will otherwise
wrongfully kill someone else does not entail the permissibility of killing to defend
heritage. One cannot simply help oneself to the language of R2P. Nor does the
permissibility of lethally defending persons indicate how much harm, if any, one may
inflict for the sake of defending a particular instance of heritage. It cannot tell us, for
example, how many people it would have been permissible to kill to save the Temple of
Bel in Palmyra.
Without at least a rough basis for comparing tangible heritage and lives, it is unclear
how one might proceed with Weiss and Connelly’s proposal. And, in addition to knowing
when we may intentionally harm those trying to destroy heritage, we need to know how
much risk we may impose on combatants and civilians for the sake of heritage. We
described above how implementing the Hague Convention increases both the risks that
combatants must take upon themselves and the risks they may impose on civilians.
Deploying troops to protect heritage—the goal of Weiss and Connelly’s proposal—also
clearly endangers combatants’ lives for the sake of heritage, along with the lives of nearby
civilians.
In the face of these essential comparisons, the idea that one could develop a framework
for the permissible use of force to defend heritage without any means of comparing
physical harms to people and damage to heritage looks clearly mistaken. If one is to
permissibly use force, one must engage in a proportionality calculation. To do this, one
must compare the harms at stake. Unless defending heritage is at least sometimes more
important than refraining from killing or seriously harming people, it cannot be
proportionate to kill to defend heritage. If heritage is never more important than
refraining from killing and seriously harming, Weiss and Connelly’s proposal to employ
military force to defend heritage does not even get off the ground. To get their proposal off
the ground, they must (contra their declaration) not only develop a model of comparing
harms to heritage and human beings that enables one to make the necessary
proportionality calculations, they must also believe that sometimes defending heritage is
more important than refraining from killing and seriously injuring humans.
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4
INTENTIONALLY KILLING FOR THE
SAKE OF HERITAGE
Liability to Harm
The beginnings of a case for justifying the forceful defense of heritage plausibly lie in
showing that an individual can become morally liable to harm in defense of heritage—that,
for example, threatening to damage or destroy a valuable artifact can cause one to forfeit
one’s usual right not to be harmed. As above, this requires showing that the value of
heritage can weigh against harm to human beings, since permissible harming rests in part
on considerations of proportionality.
That the perpetrators of attacks on heritage may be intentionally killed is simply taken
for granted by Weiss and Connelly. It is worth emphasizing here that one cannot use self-
sacrifice as a guide to the proportionality of harming. There are well-known examples of
individuals risking and sacrificing their lives in defense of heritage. One might think that
this provides examples of heritage that can weigh against human life. But the fact that
someone is willing to risk their life for the sake of some particular instance of heritage
does not show that that heritage has value that can count in a justification for harming.
That someone is prepared to die for a cause does not show even that the cause is valuable;
on the contrary, people often kill themselves or let themselves be killed for the sake of
morally bankrupt causes. And even when something is genuinely morally valuable, the
fact that one may sacrifice oneself for its sake doesn’t show that one may harm anyone
else for its sake. Being willing to risk one’s life for one’s child, for example, does not make
it permissible to kill other people for the sake of one’s child. Likewise, even if one thinks
that the Monuments Men’s willingness to risk their lives to recover stolen art was
admirable, that willingness did not itself confer on them a permission to kill other people.
Clearly, not everything that is valuable to human beings, or that makes our lives go
well, warrants forceful defense, let alone lethal defense. This is true of even some morally
significant goods, such as relationships, promises, and jobs. Imagine that Colin is about to
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be unfairly dismissed from his job. It seems impermissible for Colin to physically attack
his boss (much less kill her) even if this is the only way he can prevent this undeserved
harm (imagine that he has no evidence of the unfairness that he could take to an
employment tribunal). This isn’t a simple question of proportionality: we can imagine that
redundancy will be extremely harmful for Colin, cause him great distress, threaten his
identity and self-worth, bring financial hardship, and so on. It is rather a question of the
type of good at stake.
It is revealing that recent philosophical work on the ethics of war often focuses on
straightforward comparisons of physical harms when discussing proportionality, for
example, how many combatants or civilians will be killed in an offensive, compared to
how many lives we might thereby save.45 This is of course important and useful. War
involves a lot of killing and maiming, and we have at least some idea of how to weigh
these things against each other. But it is much harder to judge the number of people
whom one may kill to, say, defend political rights or territory. Even granting that citizens
have rights to self-determination, it is hard to know how many people one may kill and
injure to secure those rights.46
The difficulty of comparing the value of heritage to the disvalue of death and injury is
not unique, then: wars are fought over other values that do not reduce to physical harms
to people. But, at the very least, the permissibility of lethally defending artifacts is
considerably less well supported by our intuitive judgments than the permissibility of
lethally defending our lives and liberty. The intuition that an innocent person may kill in
defense of her life enjoys near-universal support. It is similarly intuitive that a kidnapping
victim may kill to escape her abductor even if she believes that he will merely imprison
her for a significant period of time rather than kill her. Intuitions about the permissibility
of killing in defense of one’s home vary, but this variation tends to track whether there is a
duty to retreat from one’s home, on the assumption that one could safely reclaim the
home later. In cases of unjust forced occupation—that is, a threat of long-term or
permanent displacement from one’s home—the permissibility of lethal defense seems to
enjoy widespread intuitive support.47
One of the difficulties with intrinsic justifications for force is that their proponents tend
to invoke the harm that would follow from eradicating the heritage of a given group to
support forcefully preventing its partial destruction. Consider, for example, the above
claims by Kourbaj and Rapley, both of which defend the protection of heritage by citing
the harm that would befall a people without any heritage at all.48 But the harms of
eradication and partial destruction seem to differ not merely in degree but also in kind.
It’s plausible that the eradication of a group’s tangible heritage often has a seriously
detrimental effect on its members’ identity, flourishing, and so on. The degree to which it
does so might depend on the group in question: many people draw on multiple sources of
identity (religion, ethnicity, nationality, profession, familial status), which plausibly
increases their resilience in the face of a threat to any one particular source.
22 J. PAUL GETTY TRUST OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN CULTURAL HERITAGE POLICY
But it is considerably harder to make general claims about the effect of the partial loss
of heritage on a group’s members. Communities that suffer even widespread losses of
their cultural sites through natural disasters, for example, are undoubtedly harmed. But it
is not clear that such losses threaten their members’ sense of identity and community in
the way that the eradication of heritage plausibly does. Thus, even if preventing the
eradication of an entire body of tangible heritage warrants the use of lethal force, it does
not follow that preventing the destruction of even a substantial subset of that heritage also
warrants lethal force.
Moreover, the eradication of an entire heritage, rather than just its tangible
manifestations, requires more than attacks on heritage sites. Eradicating stories, songs,
languages, cuisines, and so on typically requires direct harmful interference (or threats of
such interference) with persons. But (threats of) these types of interference with
persons—physical harms or unjust imprisonment, for example—fall under the more
familiar scope of rights to defensive force. Lethal prevention of the eradication of heritage
may thus be justified on grounds that do not obtain in cases of partial destruction. Again,
one cannot straightforwardly extrapolate from the permissibility of forcefully preventing
these types of harms to the permissibility of forcefully defending tangible heritage.
The permissibility of killing in defense of important works of art or buildings also
enjoys less intuitive support than killing in defense of our interests in life and liberty. Of
course, many actions that threaten cultural artifacts will also threaten people: it would
clearly be permissible to kill someone to prevent her from blowing up a mosque with
people inside or nearby, even if the people were not her target. One must be careful, then,
not to wrongly infer that protecting the building, rather than protecting people, justifies
killing. Put another way, one cannot infer from the fact that one has a justification for
forcefully protecting a valuable building that it is the value of the building that justifies
forcefully protecting it.
One must also be sure not to conflate what we can call law and order justifications for
harming with harming for the sake of heritage. For example, we might agree that if
someone were going around a museum or gallery methodically destroying every piece of
art, it could be permissible to kill her if this were the only way to stop her. Even if one may
not kill to save one or two paintings, perhaps the wrongs could aggregate to make lethal
defense proportionate.49 But this permissibility could be explained by our interest in
maintaining law and order rather than the value of cultural artifacts. After all, it seems
similarly permissible to prevent the destruction of other types of property. It would be
impermissible to kill someone to prevent her from destroying one’s car, but it could be
permissible to kill her if she is destroying every car she comes across and there is no other
way to stop her. In simple terms, we do not let people commit gratuitous acts of violence
against property, and in the absence of nonlethal means of prevention, these acts of
violence could aggregate to make lethal force proportionate. If so, the fact that it might be
permissible to kill a person to stop her from destroying everything in the Tate does not
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show that cultural artifacts warrant lethal defense. It might show only that one may
sometimes lethally enforce law and order. Nor, of course, does the fact that one might
have law-and-order justifications for harming show that one may not also lethally defend
cultural artifacts in their own right. Our point is simply that one needs some argument for
permissibility of doing so if one is proposing the defense of heritage as a just cause for
war.
None of this is to deny the distress that the destruction of cultural property might cause
to humans. That distress is morally significant, because human suffering is always morally
significant. But, as above, one should be cautious about assuming that this kind of
suffering could justify harming. Lots of things cause distress—the desertion of a spouse or
the loss of a job, for example—but preventing them does not ground permissions to do
physical harm. This is true even if, as in the case of Colin’s unfair dismissal, the harm is
unjust and significant. And in cases in which one may use force to protect heritage sites,
one must show that this permissibility is not grounded in some other feature, like
sustaining law and order, that might not obtain in other cases.
The claim that one may kill to defend heritage is not, then, a minor addition to, or
natural extension of, the claim that one may kill to prevent genocide. Rather, the claim
that defense of heritage is a cause for military intervention in its own right demands an
account of the permissibility of harming for the sake of defending heritage in its own
right. This requires substantial theoretical work that is absent from Weiss and Connelly’s
proposal.
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5
PROVING TOO MUCH? COLLATERAL
DAMAGE AND HERITAGE
If one were to show that harms to heritage can weigh against harms to people, one would
thereby lay the justificatory groundwork not only for intentionally harming someone who
is destroying heritage but also for collaterally harming innocent people in the course of
protecting heritage. Indeed, it’s hard to see how one could make a case for military
intervention without showing the permissibility of collaterally harming innocent people,
since wars inevitably inflict collateral damage. Of course, such harms are constrained by
the requirements of proportionality and necessity. And since harms to innocent
bystanders are harder to justify than harms to culpable attackers, one would need to be
protecting more, or more valuable, heritage to be permitted to collaterally kill an innocent
person, compared to the amount of heritage one would need to be protecting to justify
killing a culpable attacker. (Here, too, then, one needs an account of the value of heritage
that enables one to make these comparisons.) But once one grants the general claim that
protecting heritage warrants harming people, there is no principled way to restrict this to
harming those intent on destroying heritage.
We know of no explicit defense of the claim that it might be permissible to collaterally
kill innocent civilians for the sake of defending heritage, despite the calls for military
intervention from some quarters. Certainly, no such account is forthcoming in Weiss and
Connelly’s proposal. This absence might be explained by contingent features of recent
cases of heritage destruction. If a site is geographically isolated or uninhabited, there
might be no innocent bystanders, and thus the question of permissible collateral killings
for the sake of protecting heritage will not arise. Hence, making the moral case for such
killings may not have been considered pressing.
But one cannot generalize from these particular examples to simply ignore the
prospect of collateral harms: as proponents of heritage protection point out, many modern
conflicts take place in urban, populated areas. This is precisely why so much heritage is at
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risk. One cannot plausibly protect these sites with military force without imposing at least
a high risk of lethal collateral harms on bystanders. Again, the plausibility of Weiss and
Connelly’s proposal rests on their being able to show the permissibility of imposing such
risks, yet they offer no argument for this claim.
Part of the difficulty here is that one will need to justify, in each case, why defending
this instance of heritage warrants imposing significant (risks of) harm on these innocent
bystanders. In some cases, people living in proximity to a site might welcome—that is,
consent to—an intervention that aims at protecting that site, because the site is valuable to
them. Consenting to bear risks can make the otherwise impermissible imposition of risk
permissible. But we should note that there is unlikely to be universal consent in such cases
and that consent to (risks of) serious harm is not a “majority rules” game. Sometimes, the
refusal of consent by one member of a group is decisive. There will also be children in
communities who cannot consent to such risks.50
These concerns are familiar from debates regarding humanitarian intervention. But
they press even more strongly here. Human life is impersonally valuable. It can thus be
permissible to nonconsensually impose significant risks of harm on a bystander in order
to prevent greater physical harm to others. One does not need the bystander to agree that
the lives of others are valuable before one may impose such risks on her. One can also be
required to incur quite significant harms for the sake of defending or saving other
people’s lives. We have duties to rescue people, where these duties are grounded in the
impersonal value of persons rather than in consent on the part of the rescuer.
Heritage, as we have seen, plausibly has only derivative, rather than impersonal, value.
On this view, a given heritage site derives its value from its contribution to the well-being
and flourishing of a certain cultural group. The claims that this type of value makes on us
are much less clear. A cultural site may be very valuable to some people—it might, for
example, be of great significance to a Christian community, or of considerable scientific
interest—but of little or no value to those living nearby who would be endangered by its
forceful protection. Their failure to value the site is not morally objectionable in the way
that failing to value the life of a person would be: we cannot obviously insist that they
ought to value it and unilaterally impose risks on them for its sake. Their failure to value it
might not be morally objectionable at all. Given this, it is not clear that even substantial
value attributed to a site by others can weigh against harms to innocent bystanders who
do not themselves attach particular value to the site. As above, the fact that some people
may be prepared to incur serious risks for the sake of rescuing art, in light of the value
that they attach to it, does not confer on them permission to impose substantial risks of
great harm to others. We should be mindful, then, that the degree of international concern
regarding a site might not correlate with the degree of risk that it is permissible to impose
on bystanders. It is not the international community that shoulders the collateral risks of
military intervention.
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In sum, there are at least three key claims that Weiss and Connelly need to defend in
order to support their proposal. First, they must persuade us that damage to heritage can
weigh against serious harms to humans. Second, they must persuade us that it can be
proportionate to intentionally kill a person who is responsibly threatening heritage. Third,
they must persuade us that it can be proportionate to foreseeably, but unintentionally, kill
(or impose a high risk of killing) an innocent person in the course of defending heritage.
These claims are, in their general form, the backbone of any case for military force. In
more familiar parlance, they constitute just cause (i.e., the presence of a wrong that
justifies a forceful response), liability to intentional defensive harms (i.e., the
permissibility of targeting perpetrators of that wrong), and proportionality of collateral
harms (i.e., the permissibility of foreseeably killing innocent bystanders). Their absence
from Weiss and Connelly’s account is thus remarkable.
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CONCLUSION
The primary conclusion of our argument is that the issues surrounding the forceful
protection of heritage are far more morally complex than Weiss and Connelly, and those
working on heritage more widely, acknowledge. In particular, one cannot simply apply a
framework designed to prevent physical harms to people and their private property to the
protection of heritage. The protection of heritage raises difficult philosophical questions
about value, proportionality, individual liability to harm, and collateral damage with
which any proposal for heritage protection must seriously engage.
Part of our aim has been to disentangle two types of justification for heritage
protection. Extrinsic justifications hold that protecting heritage is a means of achieving
some other valuable goal, such as preventing genocide or terrorism. Intrinsic justifications
focus instead on the value of heritage itself, citing the role of heritage in making people’s
lives go well. We noted that Weiss and Connelly conflate these justifications. Their
proposal is that one might intervene militarily to protect heritage for its own sake, even in
the absence of threats of genocide, yet they offer no account of the permissibility of
harming people for the sake of heritage.
A further goal, then, has been to identify the kinds of moral claims such an account
would need to defend. Foremost among these is the claim that a person can be liable to
harm for the sake of heritage, the truth of which requires showing that one can
meaningfully compare damage to heritage to harms to people. We noted that if one can
indeed make such comparisons, they plausibly also permit the harming of innocent people
for the sake of heritage—and, indeed, that Weiss and Connelly’s proposal requires that it is
permissible to inflict such harms. One cannot wage military interventions without
imposing substantial risks of serious harm on bystanders. But one must then show not
that defense of heritage in general permits the imposing of substantial risks of serious
harm. Rather, one must show that defending this site in particular justifies imposing such
risks on those living in proximity to it. The degree of permissible collateral harms will not
obviously correlate with the value attributed to a site by the international community.
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